Russian state-aligned military forces used at least 75 flights by military and military-linked aircraft in the Central Sahel between January 2025 and July 2026, according to an analysis by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies. The finding points to a continuing air network involving aircraft historically associated with Russian private military contractors or the Russian Ministry of Defense, while the researchers caution that the count is preliminary and cannot capture every movement.
The analysis examined Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast, or ADS-B, data sourced from FlightRadar24. It filtered aircraft models historically linked to Russian military or military-contractor activity and tracked flights touching Mali, Burkina Faso or Niger. The data therefore measures observed flights that met those criteria, not the total volume of Russian-linked aviation activity in the region.
Burkina Faso accounted for 56 recorded flights, the largest number among the three countries. Mali followed with 38, while Niger recorded six. Those country totals exceed the reported minimum of 75 because individual flights could touch more than one country. C4ADS attributed Burkina Faso’s higher number in part to its position as a transit point between Mali and Niger. The organization also cited the intensity of attacks by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara during the period examined.
The flight count included state-owned operators as well as private carriers. Flight Unit 224, an airline owned by Russia’s Ministry of Defense, was the busiest single operator identified in the analysis. The United States sanctioned the airline in May 2023. Russia’s Special Flight Squadron, which transports senior officials, conducted 14 flights, while the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations conducted 12.
The ministry’s formal humanitarian role does not by itself establish the purpose of those flights. The analysis noted that prior media reporting had linked the ministry to military cargo transport to Mali, Syria and Iran. C4ADS also identified private carriers that it said remain unsanctioned by the United States, European Union and United Kingdom despite documented links to Russian military logistics. The Kyrgyzstan-registered Sapsan Airlines was one example cited in the analysis.
The reported routes indicate different patterns for state-owned and private aircraft. C4ADS said state-owned aircraft such as Flight Unit 224’s RA-82030 typically refueled at Russia’s Khmeimim air base in Syria and at Libyan locations including Al-Khadim before continuing to the Sahel. Private carriers more often passed through commercial hubs in the United Arab Emirates, Algeria and Türkiye. These routing patterns describe where aircraft were observed or assessed to have transited; they do not, on their own, establish what cargo or passengers they carried.
The network also appears in reporting on Russian military-affiliated cargo aircraft operating farther north in Africa. An April investigation by Defense News described more than a hundred flights to Algeria over the preceding year. That investigation used flight-tracking data, interviews and satellite imagery and suggested the aircraft were used both to deliver fighter jets to Algeria’s air force and to support onward flights into the Sahel and West Africa. The Algeria activity is a related part of the reported network, but it is not included in the 75-flight Central Sahel minimum unless a flight also met the C4ADS criteria for Mali, Burkina Faso or Niger.
C4ADS said its findings were intended to identify avenues for further inquiry rather than draw firm conclusions. Inconsistent ADS-B coverage limits the visibility of some flights, and operators can potentially manipulate transponder data to conceal destinations. Those constraints mean the reported figures should be treated as a minimum observed pattern, not a complete inventory of Russian-linked air movements.
The organization highlighted a growing number of flights through Togo and Algeria before or after stops in the Sahel as an area requiring additional scrutiny. That observation identifies a routing pattern for investigation, but the analysis does not establish that every such flight carried military equipment, supported combat operations or belonged to the same logistics chain. The strongest supported finding is narrower: between January 2025 and July 2026, aircraft linked through the analysis to Russian state or military networks made at least 75 observed flights touching the Central Sahel, with Burkina Faso recording the largest country total.