The Fulcrum Strategy is the Department of Defense’s explicit attempt to move the enterprise from brittle legacy IT toward an AI‑enabled, data centric fighting force. It is not a road map for incremental tweaks. It is a declaration that networks, compute, identity and human capital must be rebalanced so decision advantage accrues to the side that best protects and exploits information.

Two features stand out as fulcral priorities: first, a full court press on Zero Trust implemented with a data centric lens; second, a push to insert AI across the development and operational lifecycle through workforce and governance changes. Those priorities are not academic. The strategy frames modernized networks and compute as the enabler for faster data flows and lower latency, while naming Zero Trust as a core approach to secure that capability. At the same time the department is expanding its digital workforce construct to include data, AI and software engineering roles so AI moves from lab experiments to deployed effect.

Why those two priorities must sit at the center of doctrine

AI without trustworthy data and resilient compute is just a new failure mode. The Fulcrum Strategy ties Zero Trust to network and compute modernization so that authentication, device posture and data protections travel with information as it moves to the edge, to allies and into weapons and sensor suites. If the DoD succeeds here it will have made the basic tradecraft of war in 2030 an information management problem rather than an IT patching exercise. If it does not succeed those same information channels will amplify adversary cunning and automation.

Concrete priorities for operationalizing Fulcrum’s AI and Zero Trust ambitions

1) Treat data as the primary weapon system component. Invest in cataloging, labeling and lineage tools so models see provenance and classification continuously. Without robust data governance you will accelerate mistakes at speed and scale. This aligns with the strategy’s emphasis on data centric Zero Trust for networks and compute.

2) Bake Zero Trust into compute at the edge. DoD sensor and platform compute will increasingly live off classified enclaves, transient clouds and hardened edge fabrics. Zero Trust must be enforced across those fabrics, not just at perimeter checkpoints. The operational challenge is retrofitting legacy systems while preserving mission continuity.

3) Shift from model prototyping to an ML lifecycle governed like weapons acquisition. That means rigorous testing, transparent performance baselines, adversarial red teaming and rollback guarantees. The line between a model update and a software update must be auditable and reversible. Failure to do that will leave commanders choosing between trusting brittle autonomy or rejecting capability they need.

4) Make identity and continuous authorization nonnegotiable. Identity is the pivot point for Zero Trust. Invest in hardware anchored keys, multi factor at scale and device posture telemetry so authorization follows role, risk and context continuously across coalitions and domains.

5) Rewire governance and acquisition to prefer composable, interoperable subsystems. The Fulcrum LOE on optimizing governance is not a bureaucratic aside. It is the mechanism to force acquisition to accept modularity, observability and security by design, instead of bespoke monoliths that resist patching.

6) Expand the bench of digital talent by diversifying recruiting and career constructs. The strategy intends to broaden the DoD Cyber Workforce Framework to include data and AI roles. That is necessary but not sufficient. The department must also create paths that let digital specialists rotate between lab, program office and operational units so lessons from the field feed development quickly.

Operational and ethical friction points to watch

Zero Trust at scale will stress partner and foothold relationships. Coalition operations will require negotiated trust fabrics. The choice between strict, isolated ZT zones and flexible cross domain exchange will be a strategic tradeoff. Similarly, AI accelerated decision loops create moral and command questions about human in the loop, on the loop and out of the loop authority. Fulcrum mentions workforce and governance but leaves deep operational policy to follow. That gap is the most dangerous one because policy lags technology predictably.

Adversary calculus and deterrence implications

If the U.S. makes AI and Zero Trust the operational center of gravity it changes the asymmetric calculus for attackers. Hitting an adversary who assumes no trust and defends data in motion is more expensive than exploiting open perimeters. But the converse is also true. A successful attack that undermines data lineage or model integrity can propagate catastrophic errors. Adversaries will therefore aim for supply chain and data poisoning vectors rather than blunt network denial. The defense thus needs resilient provenance, strong model validation and proactive threat hunting as part of the Fulcrum playbook.

What success looks like in five years

Success is not every weapon system running ML nor every base on a single cloud. Success is predictable outcomes. It is the ability to authenticate and authorize a sensor, move its classified feed to an analytics enclave, run a validated model, and produce an action with documented chain of custody and rollback capability. It is also a workforce that can iterate in weeks not years and acquisition rules that reward observable, composable systems over bespoke black boxes. Those are measurable steps the Fulcrum strategy outlines in capability and workforce LOEs.

A closing provocation

Fulcrum tries to reorient the DoD toward a posture where information handling is the decisive variable on the battlefield. That reorientation will be brutal in practice because it forces the department to confront its own supply chains, people models and acquisition culture. If the department treats this as a tick box exercise it will end up with Zero Trust wallpapers and AI experiments that do not scale. If it treats this as the center of operational doctrine we will see the contours of 2035 warfare take shape now. The choice is about how the DoD will earn advantage in a contested information environment, not whether it should try.